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Abstract
This research paper focuses on the interconnections between traditional and cutting-
edge technological features of virtual currencies and the EU legal framework to prevent the
misuse of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. It
highlights a set of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT)
challenges brought about in the Internet of Money (IoM) landscape by the double-edged
nature of Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) as both transparency and privacy ori-
ented. Special attention is paid to inferences from concepts such as pseudonymity and
traceability; this contribution explores these notions by relating them to privacy enhanc-
ing mechanisms and blockchain intelligence strategies, while heeding both core elements of
the present AML/CFT obliged entities’ framework and possible new conceptualizations.
Finally, it identifies key controversies and open questions as to the actual feasibility of ef-
fectively applying the “active cooperation” AML/CFT approach to the crypto ecosystems.
1 The Internet of Money and underlying technologies
The onset and subsequent development of the so-called ”crypto economy” significantly and ubiq-
uitously transformed the global financial landscape. The latter has been extensively confronted
with non-traditional forms of currencies since the Bitcoin launch in January 2009. Relevant
industry-altering effects, both ongoing and prospective, have been outlined more clearly by ideas
such as Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) or the recently unveiled Facebook-led Libra initiative. On
a conceptual level, this disruptive1 monetary ecosystem gave birth to the notion of Internet
of Money (IoM) as a way to depict a new decentralized financial system. From a functional
perspective, it is significantly influenced by inherent technical features of Distributed Ledger
Technologies (DLTs) and, more specifically, of their blockchain-powered subset.
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1Reference is to the definition of “disruptive technologies” as “those that fundamentally alter the way we
live, work, and relate to one another” [27].
Blockchain technology (BT), in fact, is the most common DLT scheme behind cryptocur-
rencies [5]2 and its structural role within the topic at hand revolves around it being at the core
of the Bitcoin ecosystem, which can be seen as a pathfinder in the crypto sphere. Indeed, it is
widely recognized that BT’s properties responded to socio-economic queries that were pursuing
decentralized and disintermediated structures that could allow transactions to be performed
with no need of a trusted central party [43].
The relevant algorithm-based “consensus protocol” was described as leading to crowd-
sourced functions of validation and auditing, which led several European institutions to ac-
knowledge its disintermediation-wise worth [62]. BT’s unprecedented, albeit partly disputable,
degrees of verifiability, transparency, inalterability, trust and security stirred up interest in
the most diverse fields and appealed governments and stakeholders from all over the world
[9, 19, 40]. Parallelly, however, projects such as IOTA most interestingly wish to take these
features to the next level by employing blockchain-unrelated DLTs – e.g. a type of DLT called
Directed Acyclic Graph, the Tangle – to the end of appropriately targeting the Internet of
Things (IoT) industry by pursuing secure data monetization from connected devices [51].
The deep conceptual and architectural impact of these innovations was underlined by craft-
ing a broader notion: the “Internet of Value(s) (IoV)”. The IoV comprises cryptocurrencies
and purportedly labels the infrastructure of the next generation of Internet, compared with the
more traditional “Internet of Information” [59].3 Whereas the latter enables people to directly
send information to one another, the IoV removes any fences to the direct participation of
everyone to the global (digital) economy by embedding an economic layer in the Web [16, 41].
2 Crypto monetary ecosystems and relevant misuse risks
On the one hand, this innovative way of processing payments catered for the need to find
alternative solutions to traditional financial institutions. One of the main purported goals
behind this monetary (r)evolution, in fact, was the opening of financial opportunities to the
unbanked and non-traditional investors by mitigating their troubles in accessing the ordinary
banking system because of its risk-averting principles and consequent de-risking approach.4
Accordingly, crypto ecosystems were praised as conductive to financial inclusion and at a lower
regulatory cost [59, 68].
From a risk perspective, however, it cannot come as a surprise that the very same lower - and
possibly non-existent - degree of access control causes these instruments and their anonymity-
wise features to be perceived as highly vulnerable to be exploited for most diverse and large-scale
illicit purposes. Generic references may encompass transactions on the dark web, scams, ran-
somware, malware, hacking and identity theft, market manipulation and fraud, Ponzi schemes,
online gambling, financing of criminal and terrorist activities, etc [19, 27, 35, 37, 68]. Some of
these aspects were brought into the spotlight by the widely known and well-publicized Silk Road
case; the subsequent increased crypto-risk awareness arguably played a role in the shutdown of
Darknet markets such as Alphabay, Valhalla and Wall Street Market.
2From a technical and definitional standpoint, “virtual currency” and “cryptocurrency” are not synonyms.
However, despite the paramount need for conceptual clarity in the crypto realm, for the sake of the narrative they
are used interchangeably in this paper. In compliance with the EU regulatory approach, local and complementary
currencies fall outside the scope of this work.
3The notion of IoV is argued to depict the Internet as a space to transfer and store any conceivable value;
blockchain would make it possible by ensuring the security, decentralization, efficiency and transparency of such
storage [59].
4De-risking refers to the reduction in the provision of banking (and related) services to people and places
that are perceived as too risky by relevant institutions [16].
Over and beyond, Virtual Currencies (VCs) were found to generate significant money laun-
dering and terrorist financing risks [21, 27]; the primary concern is the extent to which they
can be easily resorted to in order to engage in these illicit practices. For this reason, a growing
number of domain-specific regulation attempts was spurred, against the backdrop of a broader
set of legislative and regulatory actions targeting DLTs from a technology-based perspective,
on the grounds that they often put the logic behind existing legal regimes to the test [45, 49].
Essentially, the diversity of relevant legal initiatives ranges from crypto-specific legislation
to interpretative instances of existing legal frameworks in light of new technologies; hence,
the state-of-the-art highlights a bipartite scenario comprising both a pro-active and a reactive
approach to regulatory scrutiny and intervention [40, 49]. The latter distinction may arguably
play a significant role in paving a way forward for a more suitable and effective attitude to any
discussion concerning the regulation of crypto stakeholders.
3 AML/CFT legislative and regulatory initiatives
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)5 is the most prominent international organization in
the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CFT) landscape and has
been issuing specific guidelines for VCs and Virtual Assets (VAs)6 since 2014; it is currently
working towards strengthening the application of its Recommendations to DLTs.
More specifically, in October 2018 financial activities involving VAs were explicitly included
in the scope of the FATF Recommendations and in June 2019 an Interpretive Note to Rec-
ommendation 15 (”New Technologies”) provided some further clarifications [28, 30]. On the
same occasion, the experts drafted an update of relevant guidelines concerning the Risk-Based
Approach (RBA)7 to VCs, whereby emphasis was put on examples of risk indicators concerning
transaction obfuscation and relevant inability to perform customer identification [28].
Within this framework of measures, crypto regulatory efforts target a set of entities labelled
as “Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs)”. Interestingly, according to the FATF Glossary, a
VASP is “any natural or legal person who is not covered elsewhere under the Recommendations,
and as a business conducts one or more of the following activities or operations for or on
behalf of another natural or legal person: i) exchange between virtual assets and fiat currencies,
ii) exchange between one or more forms of virtual assets, iii) transfer of virtual assets, iv)
safekeeping, and/or administration of virtual assets or instruments enabling control over virtual
assets; and v) participation in and provision of financial services related to an issuer’s offer
and/or sale of a virtual asset”. Most notably, therefore, pursuant to ii), crypto-to-crypto
exchanges are included in the scope of FATF provisions.
As far as the supranational level is concerned, the frequently mentioned European Union
5th AML Directive [21] addresses VCs and mandates Member States to regulate them. More
5The FATF is an intergovernmental organization and it is both a policy making and enforcement body. It
addresses national competent authorities and sets international standards seeking to combat money laundering,
terrorist financing and other threats to the international financial system. Notably, its Recommendations outline
a comprehensive framework of measures whose implementation is called for in order to combat money laundering
and terrorist financing.
6The FATF Glossary defines a ”virtual asset” as ”a digital representation of value that can be digitally
traded, or transferred, and can be used for payment or investment purposes. Virtual assets do not include
digital representations of fiat currencies, securities and other financial assets that are already covered elsewhere
in the FATF Recommendations.”
7The RBA is a pivotal concept in the AML/CFT realm; it requires relevant preventive and mitigatory
measures to be commensurate with the risks identified. Consequently, all stakeholders involved (e.g. the
EU commission, national authorities, supervisory authorities, obliged entities, etc) are demanded to carry out
preliminary risk assessments.
specifically, it labels ”fiat-to-crypto exchanges” and ”custodian wallet service providers”8 as
reporting/obliged entities, by listing them amongst other more traditional regulated categories
like financial institutions and professionals.
Indeed, even if Article 3(18) of the consolidated version of the AML Directive defines VCs as
“a digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public
authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a legal
status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange
and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically”, Article 2(3)(g) limits its scope
to “providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies”.
All in all, by enclosing these new set of ”institutions” as ”reporting entities” the Directive
makes them subject to AML/CFT obligations. Given the nature of a directive as a EU legal in-
strument, relevant provisions may to some extent be tailored by Member States during relevant
transposition processes. Nevertheless, relevant duties encompass, inter alia, appropriate reg-
istration and/or licensing procedures, Know Your Customer (KYC), Customer Due Diligence
(CDD), up-to-date record-retention, internal procedures, ongoing monitoring - e.g. transaction
scrutiny - and Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR). Relevant mechanisms of monitoring,
supervision and sanctions are also outlined by the abovementioned frameworks.
In a nutshell, obliged entities are preliminarily requested to conduct individualized risk
assessments, which require to take into consideration a plethora of elements, such as targeted
customers, offered products and services, geographical areas involved. Subsequently, in light
and on the basis of the development of a comprehensive risk profile, they must implement and
maintain consistent controls and monitoring efforts [68].
STR, on the other hand, is an instance of the well-known “active cooperation” duties, as
a possible outcome of prior assessment and supervision tasks, which overall comprise both
“active” and “passive” provisions. Also in the crypto context, CDD requires to identify - and
take reasonable measures to verify the identity of - transaction parties and counterparties, such
as customers (or any person purportedly acting on their behalf) and beneficial owners, as well as
to assess purpose and intended nature of the business relationship [49].9 More specifically, from
a data analytics perspective, AML/CFT transaction monitoring controls include aggregation
requirements and detection of structuring payments [35].
4 Possible pitfalls of conventional approaches
A conclusion may already be drawn; even within blockchain-powered disintermediated ecosys-
tems, and despite inherent crypto-specific socio-financial goals, the general tendency is to keep
focusing on gateways and gatekeepers to/from the traditional regulated financial system, the
so-called “chokepoints” [28]. The explicit goal of the 5th AML Directive, for instance, is to
allow competent authorities to monitor the use of VCs through relevant obliged entities [21],
albeit it is concurrently acknowledged that their inclusion in the AML/CFT compliance sphere
is not sufficient to enforce supervision on all crypto transactions [21]. In a nutshell, in fact, at
least two sets of arguments may possibly challenge this approach.
First, a massive tension can be detected between the need for financial transactions to
comply with originator/beneficiary information-related regulations and the nature of VCs as
a privacy-oriented instrument. It is widely acknowledged that cryptocurrencies were imag-
ined and created to keep intermediaries out of the picture; thus, the conceptual origin of the
8Article 3(19) of the Directive defines “custodian wallet provider” as “an entity that provides services to
safeguard private cryptographic keys on behalf of its customers, to hold, store and transfer virtual currencies”.
9Tracing the customer’s IP address may be arguably demanded when Enhanced CDD is required [28].
crypto economy is seemingly and empirically at odds with identifying middlemen to be held
accountable in the area of ensuring transparency of financial transactions. Interestingly, it has
been straightforwardly argued that there is a structural incompatibility between the concept of
transparency within non-centralized systems and financial regulatory transparency rules, since
the latter oppose any opaqueness concerning the origins of funds, reasons for operations and
relevant beneficial owners [51]. This friction appears as of topical importance because next
generation DLTs are foreseen to take the ongoing revolution beyond peer-to-peer computer
networks up to potentially including every Internet of Things (IoT)-connected device, while
ever-evolving payment-related innovations keep defying legislative attempts [45].
Secondly, the same tech design of VCs arguably mismatches traditional approaches to AM-
L/CFT regulation. Unsatisfactory legal results are caused by a diverse array of reasons, such
as: (a) distributed governance mechanisms of VCs and relevant accountability levels vary sig-
nificantly,10 (b) crypto transactions involve both traditional intermediaries and other actors,
(c) their lifecycle features a multi-layered stakeholdership,11 (d) it is difficult to assess which
innovative ecosystems properly belong to the financial services sphere, (e) their cross-border
nature and structures lead to major jurisdictional issues.
One of the main controversies tainting the current approach is that it arguably does not con-
sistently address the issue of crypto-to-crypto exchanges often being under a different regulatory
framework than crypto-to-fiat ones [35].12
In light of these inconsistencies, institutions such as the European Banking Authority
(EBA) put forward – albeit incidentally – innovative approaches to the mitigation of crypto
risks, namely a private/public co-regulation regime grounded on “regulated self-regulation”
[23, 42]. The latter is to be implemented through the so-called “regulation-through-code”
mechanism, along the lines of the concept of “regulation by design”. Besides, an AML/CFT
“self-declaration” role of the same crypto users and market participants was suggested, and is
being assessed at the EU level [21].
In general terms, it is arguably incorrect to take for granted that disruptive technology
equals disrupted law [34]. Nevertheless, a commonly agreed upon feature of BTs is to implement
tasks that are traditionally performed by law and legal institutions [46], as well as to carry an
alternative vision of the economic system [40]. These elements give rise to foresee principle-wise
alterations grounded on the transposition of socio-economic interactions to a virtual, potentially
horizontally-structured and hyper-connected world. Similarly, the inherent structure of these
tech solutions seemingly leads to a deep power shift amongst stakeholders and possibly to a so-
called “emergent technocracy” [40], thereby ostensibly challenging legislative frameworks and
relevant accountability schemes.
5 Pseudonymity, traceability and blockchain intelligence
Many crypto-related legislative and regulatory actions were argued to insufficiently acknowledge
context-specific technical aspects. Besides some comments on traditional approaches possibly
being unreasonable in the crypto landscape [41], other critics challenged both the choice of which
entities to include in the scope of AML/CFT obligations and the claimed level of anonymity and
10Namely, internal governance mechanisms range between the poles of fully public distributed ledgers and
private ledgers [42].
11Players involved, in fact, range from users to miners to exchanges to trading platforms, wallet providers,
coin investors and offerors [25].
12As recently underlined, however, under the FATF framework virtual-to-virtual and virtual-to-fiat transac-
tions are supposedly both covered by the relevant Standards [28].
privacy of DLT-based financial applications. In spite of common misconceptions, in fact, major
VCs such as Bitcoin and Ether are pseudonymous rather than anonymous and the same was
suggested for Libra [3, 44, 66]. Even if no real-world identities are involved, there are ways to link
public addresses to real identities [2, 22, 33, 43].13 Concurrently, blockchain analysis techniques
were enhanced over time and allow for a certain traceability of transaction flows; transacting
in most popular VCs was found to leak information that can be used for de-anonymization
purposes [2, 49].14 Besides, the address used – i.e. the public key –, the transferred amount
and other metadata are permanently and publicly stored on the ledger [66].
From a traceability and accountability standpoint, pseudonymity needs to be contextualized
within the framework of results that are achievable by crypto/blockchain forensics. The issue
at hand entails reference to the set of tools aimed at definitively or statistically matching actual
users to transactions performed by crypto-IDs and possibly spotting unique identifiers to indi-
viduals [1, 49, 58]. Forensic experts, in fact, can extract data from a transaction, receive the
history of a specific address and use this information to engage in “follow the money” activities,
to the end of possibly detecting the use of VCs by analyzing the retrieved data [37]. The con-
ceptual and explainability-related impacts of these intelligence strategies may only be grasped
by delving into how specific techniques – such as transaction-graph analysis, user activities/ad-
dress clustering, clustering heuristics, transaction fingerprinting by leveraging publicly available
and off-network information, web-scraping and OSINT tools - have been developed and refined
to this end.15 Reference is not limited to Bitcoin forensics; data-exploitation strategies were
deployed also on the Ethereum blockchain – notably to detect smart Ponzi schemes [14, 17] –
and discussions are ongoing for non BT-based DLTs [57].
Moreover and most interestingly, studies were presented to assess the feasibility of using
publicly available information and machine learning techniques to map Bitcoin transactions,
model the difference between licit and illicit ones from an AML screening standpoint, and
possibly predict which transactions are legal and illegal [60, 68].16 From a legal standpoint,
it is thought-provoking to notice how such analyses, e.g. their data collection and evaluation
phases, were challenged from a privacy violation perspective, while at the same time they were
defended by leveraging on the fact that they would actually make AML compliance easier and
cheaper by exploiting BT’s abovementioned features [60].
These arguments show a compelling paradox generated by the way (non-privacy-enhanced)
DLTs relate to the financial sphere. On the one hand, their pseudonymous nature provides
the opportunity of engaging in illicit activities while hiding in plain sight. On the other hand,
however, their very same data tech schemes and subsequent public availability allow for law en-
forcement experts to successfully deploy more effective, and also possibly crowdsourced, forensic
analysis techniques [68]. This ambiguity is arguably enrooted in the basic features of BTs, giv-
ing rise to even more conflicting and counter-intuitive scenarios. From an AML compliance
perspective, in fact, the use of such distributed systems is parallelly deemed to provide degrees
of traceability and credibility for a reliable registration of AML information [67].
13As for Libra, the protocol does not link accounts to real-word identities; the Calibra wallet, however,
seemingly requires AML/KYC [3, 44].
14This was also demonstrated by the arrests concerning the Wall Street Market [1, 58]
15On transaction-graph analysis:[33, 48]; On user activities clustering:[47]; On clustering heuristics [4, 43, 53];
On transaction fingerprinting using p.a. information:[33]; On using off-network information:[43, 53]; On web-
scraping and OSINT tools:[1]. For a more comprehensive outlook:[37].
16The licit or illicit nature of each transaction was assessed through heuristic processes if no other data points
were available [68].
6 VC-related privacy, anonymity enhancements and ob-
fuscation of financial flows
On a broader level, the issue of VC-related “privacy” is far from straightforward, just as its
relationship with adjacent concepts such as secrecy, traceability and pseudonymity. Studies
have tackled privacy impacts of Bitcoin implementations, where an important difference was
underlined between activity unlinkability and profile indistinguishability [4]. In order to draw
a comprehensive picture of the crypto monetary landscape from the standpoint at hand, dif-
ferent cryptocurrencies should be scrutinized in light of how their technical aspects evolved
beyond shared - albeit differently textured - traits such as distributed consensus, transaction
transparency and party entity abstraction. Because the relevant focus has generally been on
blockchain-based VCs, the issue is usually confronted by breaking the issue down to pieces of
blockchain-embedded information as to determine whether they are private or public.
More specifically, three aspects were deemed relevant in this regard: (a) privacy of identity
or user-identity privacy : it relates to the concept of anonymity and it entails assessing the link
to a real-world identity, drawing a parallel between “public and private keys” of Bitcoin-like
virtual currencies and the concepts of “username and password” [4]; (b) privacy of transaction
data/information: it is a mutable concept and relates to the fact that data is represented
differently in different blockchains, different aspects may be private from a third-party observer,
different types of information can be private to different extents [4]; (c) privacy of the total
blockchain state: different attributes of the total blockchain state can be private to different
extents [4].
Moreover, two sets of elements - a) sharpened intelligence methods, and b) concerns ex-
pressed by crypto-privacy advocates - spawned the development of the so-called “privacy coins”.
The most popular examples may be Monero and Zcash; the underlying goal is to provide true
anonymity by embedding privacy-enhancing mechanisms. The need for heightened anonymity
was interestingly contextualized within the conceptual pursuit of true fungibility amongst VCs,
a feature that could otherwise be tarnished by the immutability of relevant records [16]. Hence,
unlike what happens on the Bitcoin blockchain, these secrecy-reinforced instruments do not
keep unencrypted records of data such as wallet addresses and transactions amounts.
From a categorization perspective, three main methods have been identified to obfuscate
financial flows: (a) mixing/tumbling-based approaches; (b) zero-knowledge based privacy ; (c)
user best practices [63, 64, 65]. As far as embedded enhancements are concerned, Zcash reaches a
high degree of privacy by making use of “zero-knowledge proofs” – namely, the Zero-Knowledge
Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge, or zk-SNARK –, whereas Monero is slightly
less anonymous but implements more intensively tested techniques of ring signatures.
Interestingly enough, the “Zero Knowledge Proof” method, and the relevant possibility to
preserve confidentiality on selected data (so-called “shielded” operations), was argued to pur-
sue the union between two underlying objectives of many blockchains: to provide both user
anonymity and transparency of operations [51]. As much as such a junction may seem counter-
intuitive and definitely dangerous from an AML and illegal transactions perspective - not to
mention radically challenging relevant legal and regulatory frameworks in the financial trans-
parency sphere, as previously mentioned -, its existence must be acknowledged and addressed.
Parallelly, Zcash offers selective transparency of transactions and it was originally defined
as follows: “Bitcoin is like HTTP for money, Zcash is HTTPS”. Besides, another cryptocur-
rency, DASH, might also be arguably labelled as a “privacy coin”. As for non-blockchain-based
currencies, the possibility of enhancing IOTA’s privacy protocols notwithstanding its quantum
resilient hash-based signatures is being closely investigated [54, 57].
These arguments show how there is in fact no binary - public vs. anonymous - solution,
which highlights the need to apply a flexible and structured legal reasoning while confronting
the “anonymity set” of different blockchains. For instance, it can be argued that Monero’s
anonymity set is significantly larger than Bitcoin’s [4]. In any case, a parallel assessment can be
carried out as far as non-blockchain-based cryptocurrencies are concerned, where the analysis
potentially holds significant differences.17
On top of the possibility to enhance the degree of anonymity at an infrastructural level,
relevant users were also found to resort to so-called ”best practices”. The latter entail the use
of anonymizers, such as The Onion Router (TOR), proxies and VPNs, the Invisible Internet
Protocol (I2P) or Dark Wallet to hide the origin of the transaction or employing a new address
for every payment [37, 63]. Concurrently, in the wake of Silk Road’s takedown, darknet mar-
kets themselves started deploying more sophisticated techniques to make it more difficult for
authorities to effectively intervene [45].
7 Virtual currencies and money laundering: a multi-layered
relationship
A first way to look at the relationship between VCs and money laundering is most empirical.
ML is traditionally defined as involving three different stages: a) placement : dirty money needs
to be placed into the financial system, if not already in it; b) layering : its illegal origin needs to
be concealed through as many complex transactions as possible; c) integration: funds need to
be integrated in the financial system as cleaned. It is possible to analyze how crypto monetary
instruments may be efficiently employed in all of these steps.
Namely, a crypto-based placement phase may be eased by the low-risk opportunity to rapidly
open and access VC accounts, thereby pseudo-anonymously engaging in the relevant conversion
and consolidation of illicit proceeds. Furthermore, the cross-border nature of these instruments
facilitates layering across multiple exchanges, especially in the context of trade-based ML. As
far as the integration stage is concerned, relevant risks are argued to expand in relation to the
growing variety of goods that can be purchased with VCs; this phase is also aided by resorting
to hardware wallets. The interconnection with unregulated and crypto-to-crypto traded ICOs
further increases the overall risk; naturally, in fact, all these financial hazards are seemingly
more serious in the context of unregulated areas of the crypto ecosystems [35].
From a strict AML/CFT legal perspective, however, a further step is very significant; most
notably, crypto mixing/tumbling services are a key element in this sphere, to the extent that
the advent of Bitcoin mixing shaped the notion of ”cryptocurrency laundering” or ”crypto-
cleansing” from a conceptual standpoint [1].18 This privacy-enhancing technique leverages on
the fungibility of VCs and consists of combining inputs and outputs of different transactions
into a larger one, in order to sever the links between addresses of senders and recipients [63].
Hence, they make use of temporary false crypto wallet addresses to re-route transactions and
obfuscate the traceability chain [36].
These services cannot only be found in the online world as embedded features of “privacy
coins”; rather, other platforms offer them as-a-service, to the end of enabling users of less-
anonymous VCs to obscure identifiability of tainted coins [63]. In recent times, a more advanced
type of exchanges provide their services without requiring any login or verification [36].
17With reference to IOTA: [57]
18Common mixing services providers: Bitmixer.io, SharedCoin, Blockchain.info, Bitcoin Laundery, Bitlaun-
der, Easycoin [32].
Furthermore, Fig.1 shows how it is concurrently possible to convert Bitcoins into less track-
able altcoins via an AML/CFT unregulated crypto-to-crypto mixer after obtaining them via a
regulated fiat-to-crypto exchange. Subsequently, anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrencies (AECs)
may be used to buy illicit goods on the Dark Web, possibly through the deployment of user
best practices and precautions such as resorting to the TOR browser or VPNs, using encrypted
email services, setting up anonymous e-wallets, parceling out the total amount of owned cryp-
tocurrencies to several different wallets.
Thus, studies have highlighted different phases of the so-called crypto-cleansing, which both
state and non-state actors were deemed to engage into: (1) from fiat currency to primary VC
(through a basic exchange via traditional bank accounts or by cash through VC ATMs); (2)
mixing from primary coins to privacy-enhanced altcoins (through an advanced exchange); (3)
layering tactics through multiple AECs, exchanges and addresses; (4) integration, withdrawing
the cleansed funds from the crypto world, possibly through a hardware crypto wallet [36].
However, the money flow may actually go in the opposite direction as well, and this is another















Figure 1: Illicit use of cryptocurrencies and virtual-to-virtual layering schemes
Namely, mixing/tumbling approaches highlight the two-fold relationship between cryptocur-
rencies and ML: (a) “traditional” schemes perpetrated by resorting to VCs in the placement,
layering and integration stages of ML, and (b) cryptocurrencies laundering, i.e. tumbling ill-
gotten VAs. In the last case illicit proceeds to be laundered are VAs themselves. Not surpris-
ingly, the FATF acknowledged the entangling evolution of the VA sphere and the need for a
common understanding of the content of the relevant RBA. Relevant authorities, in fact, deemed
this ecosystem to be increasingly permeated by AECs, mixing/tumbling service providers, de-
centralized platforms and exchanges, as well as other products and services acting as enablers
for a reduction in transparency and an increase in the obfuscation of financial flows [28].
8 Open conceptual accountability issues
Recent years have shown how blockchain space and legal order feature numerous interconnec-
tions, as well as how the transformative character of DLTs causes significant and extensive
points of friction with incumbent legal systems. As far as the payment sphere is concerned,
efforts are being expended to encourage evolution while trying to mitigate the risk of destabiliz-
ing the banking and financial sector. State-of-the-art legal instruments to safeguard the latter
transparency-wise, in fact, empirically emerge as challenged by transformations brought about
by crypto tools; this research paper highlighted how some technical features that are praised
functionality-wise give rise to thoroughly unpleasant scenarios.
Arguably, the feasibility of anonymity-enhanced ecosystems complying with state-of-the-
art AML/CFT regulations appears as rather weak. Recent FATF guidelines on how to apply
relevant Recommendations may be referred to as a prime example of this. Furthermore, it
is to be noted that the same organization has called for participating jurisdictions to forbid
VASPs from engaging in activities that involve anonymity-enhancing technologies if unable to
manage and mitigate relevant risks [28], which means their so-called ”obligation to abstain”
from undertaking the operation is triggered.
At the same time, inherent features of the IoM seem to ideologically mismatch legal objec-
tives aiming at anticipating changes in criminal activities [27], giving rise to major controversies.
It was argued that AML/KYC requirements could go to the detriment of opportunities offered
to the unbanked or non-traditional investors [66].
Concurrently, while the current AML/CFT framework relies on the “active cooperation”
of the so-called “obliged entities”, the IoM is definitely developing beyond gateways and gate-
keepers. Relevant transfers do not always involve regulated third parties or beneficiaries, and
recent regulatory efforts have targeted not only VAs that are convertible to fiat money but also
VAs that are convertible to another VA [28, 49]. The actual role and accountability attached to
entities included in the scope of the 5th AML Directive, together with the effectiveness of this
choice, need further scrutiny.19 Consistently, scholars and authorities have started discussing
the actual feasibility of forcing the crypto-world into a system of “approved parties” [49].
In any case, even if we try to abide by the traditional principles informing the AML/CFT
framework(s) and especially when we take into consideration the recent FATF RBA guidelines,
it seems pivotal to understand what may be the best prospective regulatory approaches to
crypto-to-crypto mixers and advanced exchanges. These platforms, in fact, seemingly pose
the most significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks; even though they have
the possibility to access their own trades and wallets balances, however, imposing any specific
regulatory burden on them would likely involve huge jurisdiction-wise controversies [36].
9 Considerations on bridging the gap between law as-we-
know-it and crypto ecosystems
When assessing the inherent (in)compatibility between current approaches and changes set forth
by blockchain-based payment and its most recent transparency and privacy-wise evolutions, it
seems desirable to take into account the need for legislative actions to focus on individual
cases rather than merely being technology-based. Due to the diversity of DLT-based or even
blockchain-based utilities, in fact, it was noted that legal efforts ought to be grounded on the
concrete function of each specific tool. On a parallel level, it is worth mentioning that all
crypto-related open questions actually relate to a broader issue: the very same role and nature
of regulation in the Internet landscape has always been far from straightforward [41].
More specifically, however, scholars have identified three categories blockchain-based imple-
mentations may belong to with respect to their legal impacts: (a) recycle box; (b) dark box;
(c) sandbox [45]. The first set of instruments are usually implemented by AML/CFT-regulated
actors and are overall compatible with existing legal frameworks, hence requiring only minor
19It is also interesting to resort to blockchain analytic service providers to validate source of wealth and
obtain a risk rating when performing Enhanced CDD [49].
adaptations;20 at the opposite side, the dark box category features use cases whose objectives
are fundamentally illegal.21 In between, a set of transformative innovations defy existing legal
schemes because compliance would destroy the specific implementation; their objective is not
illegal, but they involve risks that ought to be regulated.22 Consistently, regulatory sandbox for
blockchain was argued to call for four distinctive features: global reach, cross-sectoral flexibil-
ity, start-up friendly operating structure, use of case-tailored parameter-setting practices [45].
This categorization may provide a useful tool to apply the case-based legislation approach in
a sensitive manner. The comprehensive or piecemeal outlawing option is also to be taken into
account, as well as critics underlining that the only way to perform it would be to shut down
the Internet altogether.
With reference to innovative legal approaches, it seems advisable to carry out a comprehen-
sive analysis of the underlying ratio behind the EBA’s idea of creating a “scheme governance
authority”. This entity would ensure accountability to regulators and supervisors; its setup
would be mandatory for VC schemes wishing to be regulated as a financial service and interact
with regulated financial services [23]. The idea might be contextualized within the broader
discussion on self-regulation, co-regulation and code-based regulation as ways to provide appro-
priate domain-specific legal solutions to the Internet sphere [41]. Nonetheless, as compliance
with such a requirement could challenge the very same existence and conceptual origin of VCs,
as well as it could run the risk of destroying the whole structure, compatibility needs to be
carefully assessed. The bedrock of the ”regulation-through-code” reasoning, which makes it
potentially relevant to the IoM landscape, is that assessed tools belong to the cyberspace land-
scape, which was argued to be a realm where code complements or even substitutes law from
a normative order standpoint [40].
Consistently, a similar review should target the feasibility, advantages and disadvantages of
involving cryptocurrency users and market participants in AML/CFT compliance, to the end
of mitigating relevant risks by establishing themselves as governance authorities [25, 42].
All in all, the analysis at hand is definitively aiming at a moving target. This element cannot
be overlooked and was convincingly argued to cause the so-called ”risk of overfitting”, i.e. the
risk that rules may be technologically outdated when they enter into force. The actual dangers
daunting the crypto world, in fact, largely relate to the specific use criminals make of virtual
currencies, which in turns empirically depends on their ever-evolving anonymity features, rele-
vant degrees of blockchain-embedded privacy, and on regulation and law enforcement strategies
[27, 49, 40]. On an additional but parallel level, the same concept of ”legal overfitting” may
give rise to thoroughly inefficient rules if they were to be too specifically tailored to the needs
of individual cases to be foreseeably applied to ever-evolving technologies. Thus, (too specific)
case-based legislation may be burdened by its own set of risks.
As a final note, since the financial sector has arguably been the first area of systematic ap-
plication of BTs [40], focusing on the anonymity and transparency aspects of the IoM and cryp-
tocurrencies may provide impactful legislative and regulatory insights also with broader refer-
ence to the so-called “Blockchain 2.0” implementations such as smart contracts and blockchain-
based organizations. The broader framework of such disruption relates to how BT, among other
ideas, was argued to be structurally informing the so-called “Internet 3.0” phase [16].
20For instance, blockchain-based interbank settlement systems such as the Ripple network and the so-called
“blockchain banking” [45].
21Such as the abovementioned online drugs or weapons markets, human trafficking, money laundering, ter-
rorist financing, tax evasion, etc [45].
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